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ABSTRACT 
How did the international community respond to violent humanitarian crises and gross viola-
tions of human rights after the end of the Cold War? While from an optimistic perspective on 
global governance it is argued that humanitarian crises have been increasingly addressed, 
skeptics maintain that this response has been highly selective. However, we know very little 
about the actual extent of selectivity, since so far the international community’s reaction to 
humanitarian crises has not been systematically analyzed. The aim of this paper is to fill this 
gap by empirically examining the extent and nature of the selectivity. To do so, I identify the 
most severe humanitarian crises in the Post-Cold War era and examine whether and how the 
international community has responded to these crises. Concerning response, different modes 
of action, ranging from humanitarian aid to military intervention, and different actors, viz. 
states, international institutions, and NGOs, will be taken into account. This approach leads to 
a more precise picture of selectivity: While the international community responded inconsis-
tently to human suffering, the extent of selectivity is smaller than often claimed, and none of 
the crises identified here remained completely unaddressed. At a more theoretical level this 
means that humanitarian norms matter though their impact varies significantly. Why? To 
understand the politics of selectivity it does thus not suffice to show that humanitarian norms 
matter: rather, we need to understand why and under what circumstances they do so and, 
conversely, why and under what circumstances they do not. Therefore, factors that are likely 
to impact upon the strength of norms-countervailing power considerations, economic interests 
and institutional path dependencies-will be taken into account in further research on selectiv-
ity.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die selektive Bearbeitung von humanitären Krisen und massiven Menschenrechts-
verletzungen. Eine systematische Bestandsaufnahme. 
Aus einer optimistischen Global Governance Perspektive wird häufig argumentiert, dass die 
internationale Gemeinschaft humanitäre Notlagen nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges stärker 
bearbeitet hat, als in den Jahrzehnten zuvor. Skeptischere Diagnosen verweisen hingegen 
darauf, dass diese Bearbeitung in hohem Maße selektiv geblieben ist. Allerdings wissen wir 
sehr wenig über das tatsächliche Ausmaß und die Beschaffenheit von Selektivität, da die 
Reaktion auf humanitäre Notlagen bislang nicht systematisch untersucht worden ist. Das Ziel 
dieses Papiers ist es, diese Lücke zu schließen. Dazu werden in einem ersten Schritt die 
schwerwiegendsten gewaltassoziierten humanitären Krisen nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges 
identifiziert und auf eine Bearbeitung durch die internationale Gemeinschaft hin untersucht. 
Diese Untersuchung schließt zum einen unterschiedliche Formen der Bearbeitung mit ein, die 
von der Erbringung humanitärer Hilfe bis zum Einsatz militärischer Gewalt reichen. Zum 
anderen werden nicht nur Reaktionen von Staaten, sondern auch von transnationalen gesell-
schaftlichen Akteuren und internationalen Institutionen berücksichtigt. Als Muster zeigt sich, 
dass humanitäre Notlagen zwar in der Tat selektiv bearbeitet wurden, zugleich das Ausmaß an 
Selektivität insgesamt aber geringer ist als häufig behauptet, und keine der schwerwiegendsten 
humanitären Krisen komplett unbearbeitet blieb. Damit, so wird argumentiert, haben ‚humani-
täre‘ Normen immer ein gewisses Maß an Wirkungskraft entfaltet, das gleichwohl erheblich 
variiert. Um den Gründen für diese Varianz künftig besser auf die Spur zu kommen, genügt es 
folglich nicht zu zeigen, dass humanitäre Normen wirken. Vielmehr muss herausgearbeitet 
werden warum und unter welchen Bedingungen solche Normen ihre Wirkung voll entfalten 
können und inwiefern andere Faktoren – Macht, Interessen, Institutionen - die Wirkkraft 
humanitärer Normen konterkarieren. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1986 Jack Donnelly observed in a widely acknowledged article that the activities of 
the international human rights regime were limited to the promotion of human rights. 
What the regime lacked, however, were any kind of enforcement mechanisms to en-
sure that states comply with human rights norms, norms which Donnelly considered to 
be a “profoundly national–not international–issue” (1986: 616). “Who can force a 
government to respect human rights?”–he asked rhetorically–“The only plausible 
candidates are the people whose rights are at stake” (p. 617). Since then, obviously, 
much has changed. Not only is it widely agreed that human rights violations and hu-
manitarian crises have become an international issue, but it has also been observed 
that, after the end of the Cold War, outside actors have increasingly responded to 
human suffering and in some cases have forced governments to end human rights 
violations. 
This trend towards an increased response to gross violations of human rights and to 
humanitarian crises, however, seems to remain highly selective. While military action 
has been taken to end large-scale human suffering in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Kosovo, 
and elsewhere, it is often argued that nothing has been in done in similar cases like the 
Congo, Myanmar, Chechnya, or, until recently, Sudan. Yet, while a high degree of 
selectivity is often maintained, we know very little about its actual extent and nature, 
since so far the international community’s reaction to humanitarian crises and gross 
violations of human rights has not been systematically analyzed. 
The aim of this paper is to fill the gap by empirically examining how the international 
community has responded to large-scale human suffering, and determining how selec-
tive this response has been. To be sure, the question here is not whether this reaction 
has been selective. We do not live in a world state with a monopoly on the use of force 
and centralized enforcement capabilities that could ensure that breaches of rules are 
treated in a consistent manner. What is of interest here, therefore, is rather the extent 
and the nature of the selectivity. The degree of selectivity has implications for the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the contemporary international order. Can the most 
basic human rights be enforced coherently, thus strengthening their universal binding 
character, or do double standards predominate, preventing the international system 
from getting closer to a normatively (more) exacting order (legalization, constitution-
alization) (Zürn et al. 2007)? A better picture of selectivity could inform us about the 
force of humanitarian norms and at the same time serve as a starting point to grasp its 
underlying causes. 
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To systematically gauge the extent and nature of selectivity, I will first briefly sketch 
two opposite trends in responding to humanitarian crises after the cold war (1). I then 
identify the most severe humanitarian crises that occurred after the end of the Cold 
War (2), and examine whether and how the international community has responded to 
these crises (3). Concerning response, different modes of action, ranging from humani-
tarian aid to military intervention, and different levels of action, national or unilateral 
reactions of states, transnational responses of NGOs, and international reactions of 
international and supranational institutions will be taken into account. This approach 
should lead to a more precise picture of selectivity whose theoretical implications will 
then be discussed in the last part of the paper (4). 
1. TWO CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL SECURITY 
GOVERNANCE 
Two opposite trends have been identified in the international community’s response to 
humanitarian crises and gross violations of human rights. From an optimistic perspec-
tive on global governance, it has been argued that during the last two decades the 
international community has responded more strongly to large-scale human suffering 
than in the past. Optimists point inter alia to an increase in humanitarian aid, the rising 
numbers of peacekeeping operations, and an increased use of “supranational coercion” 
in the form of transitional administrations, economic sanctions, and humanitarian 
interventions. Furthermore, they consider the establishment of international and inter-
nationalized ad-hoc criminal courts and the creation of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) to be first signs of an unexpected legalization in the sphere of interna-
tional security. Skeptics, on the other hand, maintain that this trend is characterized by 
countervailing processes of “de-legalization” and that it has remained highly selective.  
Global Governance optimists ascribe the increased humanitarian activity to three 
factors: the transformation of global security threats, the change of international 
norms, and the end of the East-West conflict. 
First, the transformation of international security threats required a stronger response 
by the international community. This transformation of security threats refers to the 
changing nature of conflict, the problem of state collapse, and complex humanitarian 
emergencies (Jackson 1990; Zartman 1995; Kaldor 1999). Conflicts within states are 
considered to be a major source of humanitarian crises (Nafziger et al. 2000); more-
over, such conflicts have gained in relative importance vis-à-vis wars between or 
among states. While the number of such inter-state wars remained on a relatively low 
level, the number of intra-state conflicts—and with them the number of humanitarian 
emergencies—has risen steadily since the beginning of the Cold War, coming to a 
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peak in the mid-1990s, “the age of humanitarian crises,” according to Väyrynen 
(1996). Since then, civil wars have declined significantly (Human Security Report 
2005). Yet, today, intra-state war still occurs eight times as frequently as war between 
states (Chojnacki 2006: 28). Thus, humanitarian crises like those in the Congo or 
currently Darfur remain a highly relevant problem of international politics—and not 
only for humanitarian reasons. The case of Afghanistan reveals the strong links be-
tween human rights violations, state failure, and international terrorism (Wheeler 
2003). 
Second, the stronger reaction to humanitarian crises is considered to have been pro-
moted by a change of international norms. The significance of human rights norms 
has grown considerably over the past 30 years. According to Sandholtz (2002: 201) “a 
globalization of basic human rights values has occurred, such that there seems to be a 
universal consensus that no culture or political system is justified in curtailing the 
essential rights of its people.” International institutions and transnational human rights 
networks that brought pressure on states from “above” and from “below” to acknowl-
edge human rights standards were crucial in this process (Brysk 1993; Keck/Sikkink 
1997; Risse et al. 1999). While human rights norms became more powerful, the prin-
ciple of state sovereignty declined in importance. Of course, sovereignty remains a 
fundamental norm of the international system; however, it is no longer solely under-
stood as the supreme power to exercise political authority. Sovereignty is now concep-
tualized as a state’s responsibility towards its citizens (“sovereignty as responsibility,” 
responsibility to protect) and bound to certain conditions (Deng et al. 1996; ICISS 
2001). Sovereign rights might be forfeited “where a population is suffering serious 
harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure and the state in 
question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it” (ICISS 2001: XI). In September 
2005, the concept of the “responsibility to protect” was approved by all states in the 
UN World Summit as a new norm of international law. It was also incorporated into 
the Charter of the African Union (AU). This apparent evolution in international law 
seems to be reinforced by the emergence of “cosmopolitan solidarity” (Linklater 1998; 
Radtke 2007). According to Archibugi (2004: 439), “Globalization engenders new 
social movements engaged with issues that affect other individuals and communities, 
even when these are geographically and culturally very distant from their own political 
community.” The significant increase of humanitarian interventions after the end of 
the Cold War indicates that, in cases of norm collisions between human rights and 
sovereignty, the former now frequently supersede the traditional rules of non-
intervention and the non-use of force (Wheeler 2000; Finnemore 2003). 
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Finally, according to global governance optimists, it was the end of the Cold War and, 
as a result, the breaking of the UN Security Council’s stalemate that led to an increase 
in international humanitarian activity. For decades the veto powers had been unable to 
assume their primary responsibilities, that is, the maintenance of international peace 
and security. This changed, however, after 1990. The number of vetoes declined 
sharply and the Council used its enlarged room for maneuver to authorize a high num-
ber of both UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions (Bellamy/Williams 2005). Addi-
tionally, the Council expanded the scope of what constitutes, according to article 39 of 
the UN Charter, a “threat to international peace and security” to include inter alia civil 
wars, humanitarian crises, and coups against democratically elected regimes (Ches-
terman 2001: 127 ff.; Wallensteen/Johannson 2004: 28 ff.). As a consequence, the 
Security Council increasingly applied “supranational coercion” under chapter VII: By 
majority decisions and against the will of the concerned state or party to the conflict 
the Council responded to humanitarian crises through the establishment of transitional 
administrations (see Chesterman 2005), the imposition of economic sanctions (see 
Cortright/Lopez 2000; Wallensteen/Staibano 2005), and the setting up of international 
and internationalized criminal courts (see Romano et al. 2004). Finally, in some cases 
(for example, North Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo), the Council also au-
thorized humanitarian interventions to halt systematic abuses of human rights 
(Wheeler 2000; Finnemore 2003; Welsh 2004).  
The second, more skeptical, perspective on global governance points to opposite 
trends, shifts, and inconsistencies in the field of international security and human 
rights, which optimists often tend to ignore. Von Schorlemer (2004), for example, 
shows that, parallel to some initial indications of legalization, we can also observe 
significant processes of “de-legalization” like the US resistance to the ICC, or the wars 
in Kosovo and Iraq, which were conducted without UN authorization. To this list one 
could add the open breach of international humanitarian law in the “war on terror.” 
Other scholars have identified a gap between the increased rhetorical commitment to 
and formal acceptance of human rights norms, on the one hand, and the continued 
violation of these same norms on the other (Cardenas 2004: 213; Liese 2006: 14), a 
fact that Krasner (1999) has described as “organized hypocrisy.” Such discrepancies 
have also been detected with respect to humanitarian interventions. While states inter-
vened militarily in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo to come to the rescue 
of threatened populations, they chose not to do so in other at least equally flagrant 
crises like Angola, Congo, Burundi, and Myanmar (not to mention Kurdistan or 
Chechnya). More specifically, Kühne (2000: 299) identifies an “intervention gap,” 
resulting from the fact that the Security Council now frequently qualifies gross viola-
tions of human rights and humanitarian crises as a “threat to international peace and 
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security” (UN Charter, article 39), often without taking then subsequent measures 
under chapter VII to respond to these situations.1  
This point deserves attention. Paradoxically, it is only because of the expansion of 
article 39 and the increased willingness of the international community to respond to 
human suffering that these “governance gaps” emerge and are perceived as such. The 
factors described above—that is, the new security threats, international norm change, 
and the end of the Cold War—extended states’ and international institutions’ room for 
maneuver in dealing with human suffering. Accordingly, the international community 
responded to more but not all crises (cf. Boulden 2006: 413). The visibility of this gap 
is further heightened by the activity of non-state actors. Human rights NGOs not only 
verify compliance with human rights standards, and generate reputation costs for norm 
violators, they also decry the international community’s inaction in the face of massive 
human suffering. According to Franck (1990: 143) selectivity or inconsistency can be 
described as the unfulfilled expectation that “conceptually alike cases will be treated 
alike,” or in Damrosch’s (2000: 405) words, that there is no “principled treatment of 
comparable cases.” The problem of selectivity results from the fact that, on the on 
hand, human rights as embodied in the UN Charter, the Universal Declarations of 
Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and the Interna-
tional Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights are universally valid and, in some parts, even compelling (jus cogens), while, 
on the other hand, their application often remains inconsistent. In the long run, this 
practice undermines both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the international 
order. 
As regards effectiveness, according to Dworkin (1986), the coherent application of a 
rule can be considered to be a key factor in explaining why rules compel. Accordingly, 
when applied or enforced only selectively, human rights norms loose their binding 
character. By the same token, consistency is critical for the legitimacy of global gov-
ernance: 
Concern with principle and principled application are critical if the system of interna-
tional relations is to evolve beyond mere state interests and power politics toward ful-
filment of the aspiration for the rule of law. Critics of international law complain that a 
system can hardly qualify as ‘law’ when its rules are enforced only selectively and only 
in accordance with the preferences of great powers (Damrosch 2000: 405). 
                                                 
1 For the Security Council’s selective treatment of conflicts and humanitarian crises see also Zangl 
(2002: 15-119), Rittberger/Zangl (2003: 304), Wallensteen/Johannson (2004), and Boulden 
(2006). 
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Accordingly, the selective response to human rights abuses and humanitarian crises 
has been sharply criticized.2 If conducted only selectively, it is argued, then the mo-
tives behind intervention cannot be truly humanitarian. Not only NGOs systematically 
condemn the existence of double standards, the international community’s selective 
reaction to these crises also serves as an argument for critics of humanitarian interven-
tion.3 The United Nations, too, has criticized countries for selectivity in many cases. In 
1992, for example, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali accused 
western states of waging “a rich man’s war in Yugoslavia while not lifting a finger to 
save Somalia from disintegration” (Boutros-Ghali cited in Hirsch/Oakley 1995: 37). 
Pointing to the intervention in Kosovo, his successor, Kofi Annan, stated: 
If the new commitment to intervention in the face of extreme suffering is to retain the 
support of the world’s peoples, it must be—and must be seen to be—fairly and consis-
tently applied, irrespective of region or nation. Humanity, after all, is indivisible (Annan 
cited in Damrosch 2000: 106). 
Yet, other scholars defend selectivity. Consistency, they argue, is simply unachievable 
because economic and especially military resources are limited, the permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council can veto decisions, and great powers and their allies are 
protected from interventions due to their military capabilities (see, for example, 
Chayes/Chayes (1995: 63). For some authors consistency is not even desirable. The 
decision to intervene (or not to intervene), they argue, is the result of open political 
bargaining processes in which the costs and benefits of an intervention have to be 
weighed against other legitimate considerations like the risk to one’s own troops or the 
stability of the international system (see Kritsiotis 2004: 71; Weiss 2005: 237 f.). 
These issues will not be discussed here in further detail.4 In the remainder of this paper 
I will systematically examine how the international community responded to humani-
tarian crises, since both diagnoses mentioned above are methodologically weak. 
Global governance optimists are guilty of selection bias—they mostly focus on crises 
to which the international community responded (militarily), but ignore cases where 
states and international governmental organizations (IGOs) chose not to intervene 
(Gilligan/Stedman 2003: 42). The skeptics’ finding of a highly selective response to 
humanitarian crises, however, is also problematic. First, the critique of selectivity and 
double standards can only be formulated against the backdrop of the international 
community’s having responded more strongly to humanitarian crises in the first place. 
                                                 
2 The problem of selectivity is mostly addressed in the context of humanitarian intervention. Selec-
tivity, however, is also relevant for non-military means, like sanctions or peace-keeping (Brown 
(2003). 33). 
3 For an overview of these arguments, see Brown (2003).  
4 For this debate, see Damrosch (2000), Evans (2002), Brown (2003), and Brillmayer (1995).  
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Put differently: While there was an increase on the supply side, the demand for strong 
responses to humanitarian crises augmented even more. What is more, the skeptical 
diagnosis usually relies on anecdotic evidence and in most cases focuses exclusively 
on states (which chose not to act) and military interventions (which did not take 
place), while the role of non-state actors and non-military means in addressing human 
rights violations go largely unnoticed. The resulting dichotomy between “military 
humanitarian intervention” versus “doing nothing” might easily overstate the real 
extent of selectivity (Chesterman 2001: 236; Bellamy 2003). 
To overcome these methodological weaknesses, the most severe crises after the end of 
the Cold War will be reproducibly identified and then tested for the international 
community’s response. At the same time, the double analytical restriction on state 
actions and the use of military force will be given up so as to include non-state actors 
and non-military means. This approach should yield more nuanced results on selectiv-
ity, the theoretical implications of which will then be discussed in the last part of the 
paper. 
2. HUMANITARIAN CRISES 
It is difficult to “objectively” select the most severe cases of humanitarian crises or, in 
Wheeler’s words, “supreme humanitarian emergencies” after the end of the Cold War 
(Wheeler 2001: 34). Yet, to arrive at a reproducible, largely non-arbitrary case selec-
tion of the most serious crises, it is necessary to first define such crises operationally. 
In order to limit the case selection to the most severe humanitarian crises it is then 
necessary to set minimum thresholds for each of the indicators of a crisis. 
2.1 DEFINITION 
The core element of humanitarian crisis is large-scale human suffering resulting from 
the violation or destruction of the physical integrity of many people. Accordingly, 
humanitarian crises are not only characterized by a large number of casualties, but also 
by substantial dislocations of populations and insufficient access to food and health 
care. Drawing on Väyrynen (2000: 49), this paper operationally defines a humanitar-
ian crisis as a “profound social crisis which is characterized by high numbers of casu-
alties, a large scale of internal and external displacement, and widespread hunger and 
disease.”5 
                                                 
5 Most definitions of humanitarian crises include these four dimensions: armed conflict, displace-
ment, hunger, and disease. Some authors add economic downturn or state collapse: see, for exam-
ple, Natsios (1997), Auvinen/Nafziger (1999); Eberwein/Chojnacki (1998), Chojnacki (2002), 
Weiss (2005). 
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This definition is sufficiently broad to cover not only direct casualties but, through the 
indicators “displacement,” “hunger,” and “disease,” also the indirect victims of a 
humanitarian crisis, whose number is often many times higher. Furthermore, the defi-
nition used here does not consider the causes of a crisis, and thus a priori covers dif-
ferent types of crises (human-made as well as natural disasters). This paper, however, 
only focuses on violent humanitarian crises, namely, human-made crises that are 
directly linked to violent conflict. This limitation is justified by empirical findings that 
consider violent conflicts, especially intra-state conflicts, to be the main source of 
humanitarian crises (Nafziger et al. 2000). Thus, humanitarian crises and armed con-
flicts are closely linked but not identical: that is, armed conflict is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the existence of a violent humanitarian crisis. The definition in 
this paper applies only to situations in which collective violence goes along with dis-
placement and/or hunger and/or disease. 
2.2 OPERATIONALIZATION AND CASE SELECTION 
The operationalization of the key indicators also relies on Väyrynen (2000).6 The 
casualties of a conflict are measured by the number of “battle-deaths” and the conflict 
intensity. For displacement, I determine the number of refugees and IDPs (internally 
displaced persons), while hunger and disease are operationalized, respectively, by the 
share of undernourished people in the total population of a country and by the mortal-
ity rate of children under five.7 In addition to Väyrynen, I collect data for all years of a 
crisis to capture the course and peaks of an emergency. This allows us to evaluate 
whether the international community responded timely to a crisis. Second, to better 
compare the extent of displacement, the number of refugees and IDPs is systematically 
weighed against the total population of the affected country. Finally, I include gross 
human rights violations as an additional key element of humanitarian crises that will 
be operationalized by a country’s level of political terror. 
In order to single out the most serious instances of humanitarian crises after the cold 
war, minimum thresholds for the indicators discussed above need to be set. The 
thresholds will be those of the crisis in Kosovo that has been described as rather lim-
ited but nevertheless led to a very strong response on the part of the international 
community. Up to the time of the intervention in March 1998, about 1,000 people died 
while approximately 400,000 people were displaced (200,000 of these internally). This 
amounted to 20 percent of Kosovo’s total population (Independent International 
                                                 
6 Raimo Väyrynen (1996, 2000) offers a valuable and detailed discussion on the concept of humani-
tarian emergencies. 
7 Väyrynen operationalizes hunger by the share of underweight children under five years of age; yet, 
this operationalization is difficult because of insufficient data. 
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Commission on Kosovo 2001: 2). Since data is lacking for the indicators “hunger” and 
“disease” in the case of Kosovo (they are available only for Serbia and Montenegro), I 
set minimum thresholds of 27% for the share of undernourished people in the total 
population (hunger), and 123 per 1000 live births for the mortality rate of children 
under five (disease).8 These thresholds relate to that fifth of the world’s counties, 
which is most affected by hunger and disease. The aim of this approach is to repro-
ducibly identify the most serious humanitarian crises after 1991 and to avoid selection 
bias. However, a number of problems arise in connection of this procedure. First, the 
thresholds for hunger and disease are still arbitrary; second, the availability and reli-
ability of data are insufficient in many cases; third, most information on casualties, 
displacement, hunger, and disease is available only for nation-states, while humanitar-
ian crises, even the most serious crises, are often limited geographically. However, if 
only national data were considered, many crises would go unnoticed. In Chechnya, for 
example, one-third to one-half of the country’s total population was displaced during 
wartimes. This, however, accounts for less than one percent of Russia’s population. 
For these reasons, I try to include as many sub-state-level data (regional, provincial, 
etc.) as possible, use not only quantitative but also qualitative data,9 and handle un-
clear cases separately. 
(1) Armed conflicts 
Armed conflicts—especially those within a state—are considered to be one of the 
main sources of humanitarian crises. Sometimes such internal conflicts take the form 
of genocide or politicide, and are then automatically included in the case selection 
because of the sheer magnitude of human suffering (Väyrynen 2000: 54). Barbara 
Harff (2003) identifies three cases of genocide after the end of the Cold War—Bosnia 
1992-1995, Burundi 1993, and Rwanda 1994—and five cases of severe politicide with 
annual numbers of deaths totaling more than 16,000—Iraq 1990-1991, Angola 1990-
2002, Afghanistan 1990-1992, and Sudan 1990-2000 and since 2003.10 In contrast to 
genocide, civil wars occur much more frequently. Harbom/Wallensteen (2005: 624), 
for example, count 111 intra-state conflicts after the Cold War that are categorized as 
“minor armed conflicts” (less than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the conflict), 
                                                 
8 Own calculations on the basis of FAO data for 173 countries for the years 2001 to 2003 <http:// 
www.fao.org/faostat/foodsecurity/Files/PrevalenceUndernourishment_en.xls>, accessed February 
2007; and UNDP Human Development Report data for 177 countries in 2003 <http://hdr.undp. 
org/statistics/data/indicators.cfm?x=94&y=1&z=1>, accessed February 2007. 
9 For a large number of case studies on humanitarian crises and humanitarian policies, see the 
Humanitarianism and War Project at Tuft’s University <http://hwproject.tufts.edu/about.html>, 
accessed February 2007. 
10 See <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/genocide/>; magnitude greater than three out of five, i.e., 
more than 16,000 deaths per year. See also PITF Codebook: <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/ 
pitf/pitfcode.htm>, accessed February 2007. 
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“intermediate conflicts” (more than 25 but less than 1,000 deaths per year), and “wars” 
(more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year).11 This paper a priori includes all 
those conflicts which, as in the case of Kosovo, were coded as “wars” for at least two 
consecutive years. Conflicts that qualify as “war” for only one year are also included if 
they were coded as a “minor” or an “intermediate” conflict in the year that preceded or 
followed. The aim is to only include those crises which display a sustained, high level 
of collective violence, presenting the international community with a realistic oppor-
tunity to react. If these thresholds are applied to the time period from 1991 to 2004, 
such conflicts took place in 27 countries. 
(2) Displacement 
Displacement is often divided into external and internal displacement. The former is 
measured by the number of refugees, and the latter by the number of IDPs. Data is 
drawn from Monty G. Marshall’s Forcibly Dislocated Populations 1964-200212 data-
set which is based on the World Refugee Surveys of the US Committee for Refugees 
and Immigrants (USCRI). The number of refugees and IDPs will be summed and 
weighed against the affected country’s total population.13 All displacements are con-
sidered which, as in the case of Kosovo, exceed 20 percent of the total population. Of 
the 27 countries witnessing conflicts considered here, 18 also display this kind of 
displacement. In many cases, population movements did not affect the entire territory 
of a country, but rather just a particular region. This was the case in Azerbaijan (Na-
gorno-Karabakh),14 Iraq (Kurdish territories in the North),15 Russia (Chechnya),16 Sri 
Lanka (Tamil Elam),17 Sudan (southern Sudan and Darfur),18 Turkey (Kurdistan),19 
and northern Uganda.20 In these cases, therefore, sub-state data was gathered. 
                                                 
11 For the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset 1946-2005, see <http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/ 
UCDP_pub/Main_Conflict_Table46-05.xls>, accessed February 2007. For the number of battle-
field deaths, see Lacina/Gleditsch (2005) <http://new.prio.no/CSCW-Datasets/Data-on-Armed-
Conflict/Battle-Deaths-Data2/Battle-Deaths-Data/>, accessed February 2007. 
12 See <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/aci.htm> accessed February 2007. 
13 The FAO provides data on population figures, which is updated annually. See <http://faostat.fao. 
org/site/550/default.aspx>, accessed February 2007. 
14 According to Rau (2003:11), the entire Azeri population had to flee the Nagorno-Karabakh region. 
15 In Northern Iraq up to 700,000 of the approximately 3.5 million Kurds were displaced see Arbeits-
gemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung <http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf 
/kriege/117_irak-kurdistan.htm>, last accessed September 2007. 
16 Some one-third to one-half of the approximately 1.3 million Chechen people has fled Chechnya, 
according to the WHO; see <http://www.who.int/hac/crises/rus/en/>, accessed February 2007. 
17 Up to one million of the approximately 2.5 million people living in the northern and eastern parts 
of Sri Lanka were displaced during the crisis. For population statistics, see “Brief Analysis of 
Population and Housing Characteristics,” Department of Consensus and Statistics Sri Lanka 
<http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/index.asp>, last accessed September 2007. 
18 Approximately nine million people live in the provinces of southern Sudan, while three million 
live in Darfur. See <http://bevoelkerungsstatistik.de/wg.php?x=&men=gadm&lng=de&dat=32& 
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(3) Hunger and Disease  
Hunger is measured by the share of undernourished people in the total population, 
while disease levels are determined by the mortality rate of children under five years 
of age. Data is drawn from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and from the 
World Health Organization (WHO).21 As noted above, I only consider that fifth of the 
countries with the highest rates of undernourishment and child mortality, but also 
include more developed countries if one of the indicators deviates significantly from 
the prevailing standard (i.e., a change of more than 50% from the last measured value). 
Applying these criteria, 19 countries were affected by hunger and 17 by disease. 
Among these countries, there are two that were more developed but showed signifi-
cant deviation from the prevailing standard—Kosovo and Colombia.22 
(4) Human Rights Violations 
Gross violations of human rights are a further core element of humanitarian crises, but 
this element is difficult to quantify. One attempt to measure the human rights situation 
in individual countries is the Political Terror Scale which was developed by Linda 
Cornett and Mark Gibney.23 Using annual reports from Amnesty International and the 
US State Department, they assign values to countries ranging from one to five accord-
ing to their human rights record, with “level one” countries displaying a secure rule of 
law, and “level five” countries, at the opposite end of the scale, exhibiting gross viola-
tions of basic human rights, including arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial 
executions, which affect the whole population.24 In the case selection, if those coun-
tries are taken into account, which reached at least level four in two consecutive years, 
then all but three countries—Mozambique, the former Yugoslavia (Kosovo), and 
Georgia (Abkhazia)—are to be included. 
                                                                                                                                             
geo=-188&srt=pnan&col=aohdq>, last accessed September 2007. Of these nine million, more than 
five million were displaced in the South, while almost two of the three million Darfuris had to flee. 
See USCRI Country Report Sudan 2005 <http://www.refugees.org/>, last accessed September 
2007. 
19 At times, more than two million of the five million Kurds living in the southeastern provinces of 
Turkey were displaced. For population statistics see Turkey’s Statistical Yearbook 2005, pp. 54-
55. See also <http://www.die.gov.tr/ENGLISH/>, last accessed September 2007. 
20 Up to 1.5 of the five million people living in northern Uganda were displaced. For population 
statistics see Uganda Bureau of Statistics <http://www.ubos.org/census%20tabulations/cenannext 
1a.pdf>, last accessed September 2007. 
21 See <http://www.fao.org/faostat/foodsecurity/Files/PrevalenceUndernourishment_en.xls>, ac-
cessed February 2007; and the World Health reports <http://www.who.int/whr/annexes/en/>, ac-
cessed February 2007. 
22 UNDP (2002: 111). 
23 Political Terror Scale 1980-2005 <http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/DOCS/Gibney/Political 
%20Terror%20Scale%201980-2005.xls>, accessed February 2007. 
24 For coding rules, see <http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/images/Colloquium/faculty-staff/ 
Gibney%20Doc/Gibney%20Political%20Terror%20Scale.pdf>, accessed February 2007. 
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Taken together, the application of these indicators yields the following case selection. 
From 1991 to 2004, 27 countries experienced major humanitarian crises. Ten cases—
Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan (southern Sudan and Darfur) and northern Uganda—display all four dimen-
sions, that is, armed conflict, displacement, hunger, and disease. The crises in Azerbai-
jan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Georgia (Abkhazia), Guinea-Bissau, northern Iraq, Sri Lanka (Tamil Elam) and the 
former Yugoslavia are characterized by three of these indicators; the crises in Bosnia, 
Colombia, Myanmar, Nepal, Peru, Russia (Chechnya) and Turkey (Kurdistan), respec-
tively, exhibit two of the four criteria. In addition, gross violations of human rights 
occurred in almost all of these cases. Finally, India (Kashmir) and Tajikistan are in-
cluded as “unclear cases,” since they show a high level of armed violence but fall 
slightly below the threshold for the indicator “hunger.” Overall, this case selection 
seems to cover most crises also referred to in other accounts, with the notable excep-
tions of Indonesia (Timor-Leste) and Haiti, where the international community inter-
vened militarily as well. That these and other cases do not qualify as humanitarian 
crises in this paper in no way means to suggest that those countries did not experience 
human suffering: it simply means that those crises do not meet the criteria established 
in this work and have therefore been excluded from the analysis.25 
                                                 
25 For example, Timor-Leste and Haiti are not included here, because they have never been coded 
“war” in the UCDP data. 
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Countries Witnessing Major Humanitarian Crises (1991-2004) 
1 2 3 4  
 
 
Armed 
Conflict Displacement Hunger Disease 
Human Rights 
Violations 
Afghanistan, 1991-2001 x x x x x 
Angola, 1991-1995, 
1998-2002 x x x x x 
Burundi, 1993- x x x x x 
Liberia, 1991-1995, 
2000-2003 x x x x x 
Mozambique, 1991-1992 x x x x  
Rwanda, 1991-1994, 
1997-2002 x x x x x 
Sierra Leone 1991-2000 x x x x x 
Somalia 1991-1996 x x x x x 
Sudan (1+2) 1991- x x x x x Co
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Uganda 1994- x x x x x 
Azerbaijan (Karabakh), 
1992-1994 x x x  x 
Congo-Brazzaville, 
1997-1999 x  x x x 
DRC, 1996-2001 x  x x x 
Georgia (Abkhazia),  
1992-1993 x x x   
Guinea-Bissau, 
1998-1999 x  x x x 
Iraq, 1991-1996 x x n. a. x x 
Sri Lanka, 1991-2001 x x x  x 
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Yugoslavia (Kosovo),  
1998-1999 x x n. a. x  
Bosnia, 1992-1995 x x   x 
Colombia, 1991- x   x x 
Myanmar, 1991-2003 x n. a.  x x 
Nepal, 1996- x   x x 
Peru, 1991-1999 x  x  x 
Russia (Chechnya),  
1994-1996, 1999-2002 x x n. a. n. a. x 
Turkey (Kurdistan), 1991- x x n. a. n. a. x 
India (Kashmir), 1991- x  x  x 
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Tajikistan, 1992-1996 x  x  x 
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3. THE RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES  
Having determined the most serious humanitarian crises after the end of the Cold War, 
the question of whether and how the international community has responded to these 
crises can now be addressed. What can outside actors do in the face of massive human 
suffering? Using a broad definition of humanitarian intervention, Rams-
botham/Woodhouse (1996) distinguish four possible modes of reaction to such crises: 
forcible military intervention, coercive non-military intervention, non-forcible military 
intervention, and non-coercive, non-military intervention. According to these catego-
ries, I will now examine whether, in response to large-scale human suffering, the 
international community conducted military humanitarian interventions and related 
peace-enforcement operations to forcibly end a humanitarian crisis (3.1), imposed 
“material” and “social” sanctions to generate costs for non-compliant behavior of a 
party to the conflict (3.2), deployed consent-based peacekeeping missions to contrib-
ute to a peace process (3.3), or provided humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suf-
fering of people in need (3.4). If none of these measures are taken, a crisis is consid-
ered to be not addressed; reactions like the routine diplomatic condemnation of human 
rights abuses, mediation efforts, or the deployment of civilian observer missions will 
be excluded from the analysis. 
In addition to these different modes of reaction, three levels of response can be distin-
guished. Most generally, a national or unilateral response is the outward-directed 
action of an individual state (see Czempiel 1981), while transnational forms of reac-
tion are characterized by the inclusion of at least one non-state actor (Risse-Kappen 
1995: 3). Finally, international or intergovernmental reactions result from consent-
based decision-making procedures between two or more states, which take on a supra-
national character when the consensus principle is replaced by majority vote or legal 
procedures (Zürn et al. 2007: 143). 
This matrix allows us to systematically grasp the international community’s responses 
to the humanitarian crises and gross violations of human rights identified in this paper. 
The focus is on responses to ongoing crises to ensure that there is a temporal relation-
ship between the emergence of a crisis and the international community’s reaction to 
it. However, not all reactions that are theoretically conceivable can also be observed 
empirically. Moreover, the different modes of reaction are not watertight. In some 
cases, for example, it is unclear whether a peace operation qualifies as consent-based 
peacekeeping or coercive peace-enforcement. Finally, and most importantly, I will 
only control for whether and how states, international institutions, and non-state actors 
responded to crises. The important question of whether or not this response was effec-
tive cannot be addressed here. 
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Levels and Modes of Response to Humanitarian Crises 
Unilateral 
humanitarian 
interventions
Unilateral 
sanctions
Bilateral 
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relief
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military 
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NGOs
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humanitarian 
interventions
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sanctions, human 
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3.1 COERCIVE MILITARY RESPONSES: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND 
PEACE-ENFORCEMENT 
Although instances of the use of military force to end large-scale human suffering 
have increased, this option nevertheless remains a rare phenomenon in international 
politics. In contrast to other possible reactions to humanitarian crises, humanitarian 
military intervention might be the only means to effectively end such crises. Humani-
tarian military interventions can be conducted unilaterally, like India’s intervention in 
East Pakistan (1971), or Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda and Vietnam’s interven-
tion in Cambodia (both in 1979).26 Today, however, unilateral military action has 
almost entirely disappeared.27 As a rule, groups of states or international institutions 
intervene multilaterally. What is more, the principle of consensus has been increas-
ingly superseded when intervention is at issue. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN 
Security Council has applied “supranational coercion” by authorizing the use of force 
by majority vote and against the will of a government or party to the conflict 
(Zangl/Zürn 2003: 206-208). Of the 27 countries identified in this paper, which ex-
perienced major humanitarian crises after the end of the Cold War, humanitarian 
                                                 
26 The humanitarian character of these interventions is controversial (see Wheeler 2000; Chesterman 
2001). 
27 The British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 to support UNAMSIL (Operation Palliser) and 
the deployment of French troops in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 (Opération Licorne), however, come 
close to such unilateral interventions. 
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interventions occurred in the following cases: Liberia (ECOMOG), northern Iraq 
(Operation Provide Comfort), Somalia (UNITAF/UNOSOM II), Rwanda (Opération 
Turquoise), Bosnia (Operation Deliberate Force) and Sierra Leone (ECOMOG). To 
this list one could probably add the—albeit controversial—case of Afghanistan (Op-
eration Enduring Freedom),28 while the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was not 
authorized by the Security Council. In some cases military interventions also con-
tained transnational components: states, international organizations, or NGOs relied 
on so-called private military companies during their interventions in conflict regions 
(Singer 2003). For example, the United States and Great Britain made use of such 
companies in Bosnia and Sierra Leone (Binder 2007). 
3.2 NON-MILITARY COERCIVE RESPONSES: “MATERIAL” AND “SOCIAL” 
SANCTIONS 
Compared to the use of force, non-military coercion occurs more frequently. The 
underlying logic of sanctions which can range from comprehensive economic to more 
specifically targeted sanctions is to generate costs up to a state judged as violating 
international law, and thereby to induce policy change. In reaction to violent crises, 
arms embargos  were imposed on a number of occasions as a special kind of sanction, 
the “primary objective of which was not to inflict economic pain, but rather to deny 
access to weapons, thereby inducing military stalemates and preventing the conflicts 
from escalating (de Jonge Oudraat 2000: 10).The international community responded 
to humanitarian crises not only by imposing “material” sanctions or international 
criminal prosecution, but also generated reputation costs through “social” sanctions. 
After the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council made increasing use of supra-
national sanctions under chapter VII of the Charter.29 During the Cold War, the Secu-
rity Council made use of sanctions only twice (Rhodesia and South Africa). Since 
1990, however, sanctions were imposed in more than a dozen cases. Of the cases 
identified in this paper, the Council imposed sanctions with explicit humanitarian 
components against Afghanistan, Angola (UNITA), former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Liberia, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan (Darfur). In order to prosecute war crimes, 
the Council furthermore established ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, while “internationalized” or “hybrid” courts were 
created in Sierra Leone and Kosovo (see Romano et al. 2004). What is more, the 
                                                 
28 The UN Security Council authorized both ECOMOG missions and the establishment of no-fly 
zones in Iraq only a posteriori. The ECOMOG operations were originally conceived as peacekeep-
ing but then became peace-enforcement missions (see Nuamah/Zartman 2004: 141) 
29 See <http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sanction.htm>, accessed February 2007.  
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Security Council referred the crisis in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (reso-
lution 1593).  
In addition to the Security Council, regional organizations and individual states also 
imposed international and unilateral sanctions to respond to human rights violations. 
Not all of these sanctions can be examined here, so I only consider (1) arms embar-
goes by the European Union, which were decided by consensus according to article 15 
of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht), for regional sanctions, and (2) the 
sanctions policy of the United States which is by far the preeminent exerciser of uni-
lateral sanctions (see Elliott 2005: 6). The European Union responded to the crises 
identified in this paper by imposing arms embargoes in seven cases, three of which 
were not targets of UN sanctions, namely, Azerbaijan, Myanmar, and southern Sudan 
(see de Vries/Hazelet 2005: 95-107; Kreutz 2005). The United States unilaterally 
imposed sanctions with humanitarian components against Azerbaijan, Colombia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, Peru, Rwanda, Sudan and Kosovo (cf. 
Elliott et al. forthcoming).30 Altogether, sanctions were imposed against 16 countries 
experiencing humanitarian crises and gross violations of human rights.31 
“Social” sanctions are a second type of reaction that falls into the category of non-
military coercion. The verification of human rights violations and the subsequent 
process of “shaming” by transnational advocacy networks as well as international 
human rights procedures fall into this category. Although social sanctions lack en-
forcement mechanisms, the possibility to publicly criticize individual states for human 
rights violations is nevertheless considered to generate significant reputation costs (see 
Liese 2006: 103 ff.). 
To examine transnational social sanctions, I consider two main functions of human 
rights NGOs, namely, the collection and dissemination of information on human rights 
abuses, and the effort to influence decision makers (advocacy) (see Forsythe 2006: 
188-206). Because of the plethora of NGOs in the realm of human rights, the publica-
tion of detailed country reports by both Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch will be used as a proxy for the information function;32 written statements by 
NGOs with consultative status to the Commission on Human Rights will serve as a 
                                                 
30 For a comprehensive list of US unilateral sanctions, see <http://www.iie.com/research/topics/ 
sanctions/sanctions-timeline.cfm>, accessed February 2007. 
31 ECOWAS imposed sanctions against Burundi. 
32 For Amnesty International country reports, see <http://web.amnesty.org/library/engindex> (ac-
cessed February 2007), and for Human Rights Watch Country Reports, see <http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/world/index.html>, accessed February 2007. 
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proxy for the advocacy function.33 The analysis of NGO activity reveals that NGOs 
reported in detail on all humanitarian crises and, with the exception of only very few 
cases, addressed written statements to the Commission on Human Rights. 
For the use of international social sanctions, I focus on human rights procedures of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights which has been described as the “single most 
important institution of the global human rights regime” (Donnelly 1998: 52). Here, 
two key human rights mechanisms are of particular interest. The first mechanism, the 
so-called “1503 procedure,” enables the Commission to investigate human rights 
violations in a particular country, on the basis of individual complaints.34 The second 
important mechanism is the appointment of country “rapporteurs” who report over a 
longer period of time to the Commission on a country’s human rights situation. Both 
mechanisms are supranational to some degree, since it is not the members of the 
Commission who act, but widely independent experts of the sub-commission and the 
country rapporteurs who can take action with relatively few political constraints (Don-
nelly 1998: 53-55). In the crises identified here, Azerbaijan, Liberia, Myanmar, 
Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda were examined under the 1503 procedure. Moreover, the 
Commission appointed country rapporteurs for Afghanistan, Bosnia, Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Myanmar, Rwanda, Sudan, and the Kosovo. 
3.3 NON-COERCIVE MILITARY RESPONSES: PEACEKEEPING 
In contrast to these coercive measures, the third category of responses to humanitarian 
crises, peacekeeping, requires the consent of the parties to a conflict. Peacekeeping 
operations cannot end humanitarian crises. Rather, they are designed “to contribute to, 
implement and sustain a peace process” (Wallensteen 2002: 252). Peacekeeping op-
erations rose dramatically in numbers after the end of the Cold War. These are con-
ducted mostly by the United Nations or regional organizations (ECOWAS, AU, 
NATO, EU, OSCE, CIS, CEMA, etc.) (Bellamy/Williams 2005). Falling between 
chapters VI and VII of the Charter, such missions can assume the form of military 
observer missions to monitor cease fires or create buffer zones (first-generation peace-
keeping). On a number of occasions, UN personnel have also had to execute more 
complex tasks like supporting elections or setting up civil administrations (second-
generation peacekeeping). Finally, in some cases, the mandates also provided for the 
use of force (third-generation or “robust” peacekeeping). Peacekeeping missions are 
                                                 
33 Written statements by NGOs with consultative status can be accessed via the Human Rights 
Documents database of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. See <http://ap. 
ohchr.org/documents/mainec.aspx>, accessed February 2007. 
34 These procedures are confidential. Since 1978, however, the Commission publishes lists with 
those countries that were examined under the 1503 procedure (Liese 2006: 78).  
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only considered here when they contain an at least partially humanitarian mandate. 
Such operations were deployed in Angola (UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III), Bosnia 
(UNPROFOR)35, Burundi (OMIB, AMIB, ONUB), Georgia (UNOMIG), Guinea-
Bissau (ECOMOG), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Liberia (UNOMIL, 
UNMIL), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Rwanda (UNAMIR), Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL, 
UNAMSIL), Somalia (UNOSOM I), Sudan/Darfur (AMIS), Tajikistan (UNMOT) and 
Kosovo (OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission)36.  
3.4 NON-COERCIVE, NON-MILITARY RESPONSES: HUMANITARIAN AID  
The provision of humanitarian aid through individual states, non-governmental or-
ganizations, and international institutions is by far the largest class of responses to 
human suffering and has risen significantly over the past years (albeit to the detriment 
of development aid) (see, for example, Macrae (2002: 11).37 Traditionally, the guiding 
principles of humanitarian assistance are impartiality and neutrality. The emergence of 
“new” civil wars, in which civilian populations have been major targets, has meant 
that the provision of humanitarian aid be enforced. As a consequence, humanitarian 
relief has lost its neutral character and has become increasingly politicized and milita-
rized (Duffield 2005). Humanitarian assistance will nonetheless be subsumed under 
non-coercive responses, first, because humanitarian relief in most cases still does not 
need to be enforced and, second, because the principal actors on the ground—NGOs 
and UN agencies—are themselves unable to use military force. 
The analysis of bilateral assistance is limited to the United States as the largest donor 
in absolute terms (Smilie/Minear 2004: 12-13). The most important institution of 
bilateral humanitarian aid is USAID’s Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA) (see Stoddard 2002: 39-50). According to the OFDA’s annual reports from 
1991 to 2004, the United States provided bilateral humanitarian assistance in all but 
four cases of humanitarian crisis, namely, Peru, Russia (Chechnya), India (Kashmir) 
and Turkey (Kurdistan).38 
                                                 
35 Formally, peace-enforcement. 
36 Source: SIPRI-Database on Multilateral Peace Operations. See <http://conflict.sipri.org/SIPRI_ 
Internet/>, accessed February 2007; and UNDPKO <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/>, ac-
cessed February 2007. We only consider the deployment of military personnel, while mere civilian 
observer missions are excluded. 
37 It is not always possible to decide if humanitarian assistance is provided bilaterally or trans- and 
internationally, since states usually do not provide relief directly, but allocate resources to NGOs 
and UN agencies.  
38 See <http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/ 
annual_reports/index.html>, accessed February 2007. In the case of bilateral assistance, funds are 
allocated as “earmarked contributions” to NGOs and international institutions. Multilateral relief, 
in contrast, consists of “non-earmarked” contributions (Macrae 2002: 12). 
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The number of transnational NGOs working in the realm of humanitarian relief has 
increased dramatically during the last twenty years. Today, the European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO) alone maintains framework agreements with 180 NGOs 
(Macrae 2002: 15). For this reason, I only focus on the humanitarian activity of two 
principle organizations in this field: the International Committee of the Red Cross and 
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) (Doctors Without Borders). Annual reports for the 
years 1991 to 2004 show that, in all cases of crisis, with the exception of Turkey, at 
least one of the two organizations, ICRC or MSF provided humanitarian assistance. 
Finally, the examination of multilateral or international humanitarian aid through the 
UN’s humanitarian aid system (WFP, UNHCR, FAO, UNICEF, and others) leads to 
the following picture: With the exception of Myanmar, Nepal, Peru, Turkey (Kurdi-
stan), and India (Kashmir), in all cases of humanitarian crisis, the United Nations 
launched a so-called Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) through which, in response 
to disasters and emergencies, the UN raised and coordinated funds. Outside the CAP 
channels, UN agencies provided relief to all countries which experienced major hu-
manitarian crises except Peru, Turkey, and India.39  
Altogether, for bilateral, transnational, and international humanitarian, the interna-
tional community provided humanitarian relief in response to virtually all crises iden-
tified in this paper. The exception to the rule has been Turkey, because Turkish au-
thorities refused to allow outside access to the Kurdish territories for humanitarian 
purposes. In other cases like in Chechnya or Myanmar, however, governments hin-
dered the provision of humanitarian relief (Cohen 1999). 
                                                 
39 The Financial Tracking System records all reported international humanitarian aid see 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/arfts/> (accessed February 2007). 
  
Humanitarian Relief Social Sanctions Peace-keeping Material Sanctions Interventions 
Country (Region) Period Chapter  VII 
Bilateral Trans-national 
Inter-
national 
Trans-
national 
Supra-
national 
Inter-
national Unilateral Regional 
Supra-
national 
Trans-
national 
Inter-
national 
Supra-
national 
Afghanistan 1991-2001 x x x x x x   x x   x 
Angola  1991-95; 98-2002 x x x x x  x   x    
Azerbaijan 1992-94  x x x x x  x x     
Bosnia  1992-95 x x x x x x x  x x x  x 
Burundi  1993-2004 x x x x x x x  x     
Colombia  1991-2004  x x x x   x      
Congo-Brazzaville  1997-99  x x x x         
Congo-Kinshasa  1996-2001 x x x x x x x x x     
Georgia (Abkhazia)  1992-93  x x x x  x       
Guinea-Bissau  1998-99  x x x x  x       
Iraq (North)  1991-96 x x x x x x    x   x 
Liberia  1991-95; 2000-03 x x x x x x x   x   x 
Mozambique  1991-92  x x x x  x       
Myanmar  1991-2003   x x x x  x x     
Nepal  1996-2004  x x x x         
Peru  1991-99   x  x   x      
Russia (Chechnya)  1994-96; 1999-2004   x x x         
Rwanda  1991-94; 1997-2002 x x x x x x x x  x   x 
Sierra Leone  1991-2000 x x x x x  x   x x  x 
Somalia  1991-96 x x x x x  x   x   x 
Sri Lanka (Elam) 1991-2001  x x x x         
Sudan (South, Darfur) 1991-2004 x x x x x x x  x x    
Turkey (Kurdistan)  1991-2004     x         
Uganda (North) 1994-2004  x x x x x        
Yugoslavia (Kosovo)  1998-99 x x x x x x x x x x  x  
India (Kashmir) 1991-2004   x  x         
Tajikistan 1992-1996  x x x x  x       
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4. RESULTS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
How selective has the international community’s response to violent humanitarian 
crises and human rights abuses been? An empirical analysis of selectivity reveals that 
both the optimistic and the more skeptical perspective on global governance are cor-
rect to some extent. First, of course, the international community did respond selec-
tively to humanitarian crises and gross violations of human rights. Comparable cases 
of human suffering have not been treated alike. Differences in responding, however, 
not only exist among similar crises, but also within individual crises. In Afghanistan, 
for example, states only began to act after the Taliban seized power. In the years be-
fore, they did not respond, despite massive human suffering. And even though an 
instrument like the provision of humanitarian relief was applied in almost all cases, its 
use still varied significantly in scope. According to Oxfam (2000), for example, donor 
countries gave 207 US dollars for every needy person in Kosovo, while those suffering 
in Sierra Leone were given only 16 and those in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo just eight US dollars per capita. This paper did not address such differences, 
although they clearly merit more research. 
Second, although the international community responded selectively to humanitarian 
crises, none of the crises identified here remained completely unaddressed. Humanitar-
ian relief was supplied in virtually all cases. This is noteworthy, since aid is not pro-
vided automatically. While the norms governing humanitarian assistance stipulate that 
the people in need have a right to receive humanitarian assistance, states and interna-
tional institutions are not obliged to provide it (de Jonge Oudraat 1996: 194). In addi-
tion, for all crises, NGOs provided information on the human rights situation, verified 
norm violations, and exerted moral pressure on states that abused human rights and the 
international community whenever it failed to take action. In a number of instances, 
the International Commission on Human Rights also made use of their partially supra-
national procedures in “high profile countries” (Donnelly 1998: 55) like Burma, Bos-
nia, or Rwanda. In the light of severe humanitarian crises, such “soft measures” like 
the provision of humanitarian relief and the application of “social sanctions” are often 
criticized for being insufficient. Without a doubt, humanitarian crises, especially vio-
lent ones, cannot be ended by such means alone. On the other hand, humanitarian 
assistance has saved millions of lives. And although NGOs’ influence is difficult to 
measure the “naming and shaming” of human rights abuses, which is often a first but 
necessary step to putting such crises on the international political agenda, had an im-
pact on human rights policies (see Forsythe 2006: 200-206). 
Third, whenever the international community has provided humanitarian aid and 
imposed social sanctions in cases of crisis, then selectivity was restricted to three 
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modes of reaction: consent-based peacekeeping missions, the imposition of coercive 
sanctions, and the use of military force. These measures have indeed been applied 
selectively. Of the 27 crises identified here, the international community deployed 
peacekeeping missions and imposed sanctions in not more than half of the cases. 
Military humanitarian interventions were conducted in only six or seven cases, respec-
tively, if Operation Enduring Freedom is included as a humanitarian intervention. 
What is more, the UN Security Council only considered about half of the crises as 
actually constituting a “threat to international peace and security” under chapter VII. 
The other crises did not even appear on the Council’s agenda. If, however, we add up 
all of the peacekeeping missions, sanctions, and interventions, taken together they 
yield a slightly different picture, namely, that the international community responded 
by applying least one of these measures in 20 out of 27 cases. Even if only sanctions 
and interventions are considered, this still yields 16 out of 27 cases in which such 
coercive measures were applied. Thus, if all these measures are taken together, selec-
tivity does exist, but to a lesser extent than often claimed. 
Fourth, the supposed “intervention gap”—situations that the Security Council quali-
fied as “threats to international peace and security,” but that were not handled accord-
ing to chapter VII—does not exist or, more precisely, takes another form. Indeed, with 
only very few exceptions,40 the UN Security Council applied enforcement measures 
under chapter VII to all crises that had previously been considered to constitute 
“threats to international peace and security.”41 Thus, in contrast to the supposed “sim-
ple” intervention gap, there is instead a “double” intervention gap: despite their sever-
ity, a number of crises were neither considered to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security, nor were they handled according to chapter VII. These cases in-
clude Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, Myanmar, Nepal, Peru, Russia (Chechnya), Sri 
Lanka, southern Sudan, Turkey (Kurdistan), Uganda, and India (Kashmir). 
From a theoretical perspective, these results support the thesis of an increased trend 
towards trans- and supranationalization (Zürn et al. 2007) which, against all expecta-
tions, can also be observed in the field of international security: On the one hand, non-
state actors not only play a more important role in the provision of humanitarian relief, 
but also in the “naming and shaming” of human rights violations. In addition, NGOs 
have responded more consistently and more timely to humanitarian crises than states. 
At the same time the inter-state principle of consensus has been replaced by “suprana-
tional” coercion in a number of instances: material sanctions or humanitarian interven-
                                                 
40 The exceptions are Burundi and Sudan (Darfur). Yet, “robust” peacekeeping missions with chapter 
VII mandates have been deployed in Burundi and Sudan. 
41 See also Wallensteen/Johannson (2004). 
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tions have been increasingly decided by majority vote and against the will of the af-
fected state or parties to the conflict. Apart from this trend, initial evidence of the 
underlying causes of selectivity can be inferred from the analysis. The fact that none of 
the crises remained completely unaddressed indicates that humanitarian norms matter 
strongly. It can be shown that, against the backdrop of changes in the international 
normative structure, states that are unwilling to end (or which are incapable of ending) 
gross violations of human rights and humanitarian crises within their own territories 
are always confronted with a reaction by the international community—even when this 
suffering occurs in geographically remote locations or highly dissimilar cultures, and 
even when the norm-violators are very powerful. For example, European states used 
the IMF to exert pressure on Russia to end the massive human rights abuses in Chech-
nya (Finnemore 2000: 6). In the same vein, referring to the human rights situation in 
the Kurdish territories, the European Parliament threatened Turkey with blocking the 
customs union (Krauss 2000). In numerous other cases the international response was 
much stronger and has meant that the affected states forfeited sovereignty rights and 
eventually even became targets of humanitarian interventions. Yet, at the same time, in 
at least as many cases, the international community did not respond to the same extent 
to such crises, even when strong responses appeared propitious. So why is it that the 
international community strongly responded to some crises but not to others? To un-
derstand the politics of selectivity, it does not suffice to show that “humanitarian” 
norms matter. Rather, it has to been shown when and under what conditions norms 
affect state behavior, and when and under what circumstances they do not. Since the 
decision to intervene is obviously not influenced by norms alone, other factors like 
countervailing power considerations, political and economic interests, or institutional 
path dependencies that are likely to constrain norm effects also have to be taken into 
account. The question of how exactly norms, interest, and institutions interact and 
jointly produce a strong response to humanitarian crises (or not) will thus be subject to 
further research. 
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